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SWEEPING DOWN THE PLAIN: A MODERN RULE FOR 
DIRECT REVIEW IN OKLAHOMA CRIMINAL APPEALS*
Bryan Lester Dupler** 
The overriding purposes of the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals on direct review are like those of most 
appellate courts: (1) affording proper relief for harmful 
violations of the rules of the game1 and (2) minimizing future 
errors through precedents.2 This paper proposes a rule for 
*© 2014 Bryan Lester Dupler.
** Cameron University (B.A. 1989); University of Oklahoma College of Law (J.D., 1991). 
Judicial assistant to Presiding Judge David B. Lewis, Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals. I sincerely thank Judge David B. Lewis, the Judges of the Court of Criminal 
Appeals, and my colleagues at the Court for inspiration, support, and encouragement in 
writing this article. The views I have expressed here, and any mistakes, are my own. 
 1. I use the shorthand “rules of the game” throughout this paper to denote the entire 
substantive and procedural corpus of criminal and constitutional law that regularly 
concerns the courts and counsel. 
 2. Oklahoma’s modern harmless-error statute, to which I refer throughout this paper, 
is 20 O.S.2011, § 3001.1 (providing that no judgment “shall be set aside or new trial 
granted . . . on the ground of misdirection of the jury or for error in any matter of pleading 
or procedure, unless it is the opinion of the reviewing court that the error . . . has probably 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional 
or statutory right”). That statute’s earliest predecessor was O.S. 1893, § 5330 (providing 
that “[o]n an appeal the court must give judgment without regard to technical errors or 
defects, or to exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties”). 
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modernizing direct review3 of errors in Oklahoma criminal 
appeals in order to further those purposes. The new rule would 
better define the errors cognizable by the Court on direct review; 
abolish plain-error review of unpreserved errors in favor of 
Strickland analysis; and codify a uniform legal standard of 
harmful effect (i.e., prejudice) warranting appellate relief. 
Direct review is simply the first stage of appellate review 
after a criminal conviction. The Court at this stage weighs the 
merits of two general classes of alleged errors: errors 
“preserved” by timely objection on specific grounds in the court 
below; and “plain” (a.k.a. fundamental)4 errors, waived (or 
164 P. 995, 997 (Okla. Crim. App. 1917) (“[T]he province of an appellate court is to 
determine questions of law and to establish principles of law by which fair and impartial 
trials may be had.”); Brown v. State, 132 P. 359, 374 (Okla. Crim. App. 1913), overruled 
on other grounds, Buis v. State, 792 P.2d 427 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (“If verdicts are to 
be set aside when they are clearly right upon the evidence simply because the trial court on 
the spur of the moment, and in the haste of the trial, may have made some errors in its 
instructions or rulings which could not reasonably have altered the verdict before an honest 
and intelligent jury, then the enforcement of law would become a farce and courts would 
become the protectors of criminals.”); Fowler v. State, 126 P. 831, 833 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1912) (“[T]his court must give judgment without regard to technical errors or defects or 
exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”); and Martin v. 
Territory, 78 P. 88 (Okla. Terr. 1904) (“Criminal cases should be reviewed by appellate 
courts with the idea of promoting justice, and not for the purpose of determining as to 
whether there is some technical error by which the defendant may be aided in thwarting 
just punishment for his crime. A defendant has a right to a fair and impartial trial, and to be 
protected by every safeguard of the law; but when these are afforded him, and the evidence 
establishes his guilt, no technical error which has not affected the result of the trial should 
be made a means of escape. . . . In other words, appellate courts are established for the 
promotion of justice, and the correction of mistakes which deprive one or the other of the 
parties of some substantial right.”). 
 3. “Direct” here includes review in all regular appeals from capital, felony, and 
misdemeanor convictions; pre-trial juvenile and youthful offender certifications and 
reverse-certifications; delinquency adjudications; revocation and acceleration appeals from 
suspended or deferred sentencing, including drug and mental health court terminations; and 
re-sentencing appeals. See generally R. Ct. Crim. App. 1.2, 22 O.S.Supp.2013, Ch. 18, 
App. Matters of collateral review, such as post-conviction relief and habeas corpus, and 
extraordinary forms of relief such as mandamus and prohibition, are beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
 4. At least since the seminal re-appraisal of Oklahoma’s plain/fundamental error 
doctrine twenty years ago in Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994), the 
Court has expressed an obvious preference for the modern term “plain” error (maintaining 
consistency with the Legislature’s use of “plain error” in the Oklahoma Evidence Code, 12 
O.S.2011, § 2104) over the more historic “fundamental” error, while recognizing that “this 
Court in the past has interpreted the terms ‘plain error,’ ‘fundamental error’ and 
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forfeited),5 and thus insulated from ordinary review by defense 
counsel’s failure to timely object.6 The Court has developed 
over time a fairly specific description of error and its harmful, 
reversible subclasses. Preserved or not, error is a deviation from 
law, a breach of the underlying rules of the game.7 Plain error 
(1) is unpreserved—that is, forfeited or waived—error that (2) is 
obvious from the record and (3) affects the outcome of the 
proceeding.8 The harmless-error statute and longstanding case 
law dictate that only harmful (which is to say prejudicial) errors, 
those affecting the outcome of the relevant proceedings, warrant 
reversal, modification of judgment or sentence, or remand for 
re-sentencing.9
Preserved error is generally reversible when it “has 
probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, or constitutes a 
term, the “plain” or “fundamental” error doctrine “allows an appellant to get before this 
Court a complaint which would otherwise be completely waived.” Id. at 700. 
 5. Likewise, the Court has used the term “waived” to describe “what happens when an 
appellant fails to make a timely assertion of a right,” while recognizing that “waive” is 
more often associated with “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” 
Simpson, 876 P.2d at 694 n. 1 (emphasis in original). The Court recognized that “the more 
appropriate term would be a ‘forfeiture’ of a right by unintentionally failing to make a 
timely assertion.” Id. (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)) (emphasis 
in original). 
 6. Simpson, 876 P.2d at 692–93 (acknowledging and restating prior law providing that 
failure to object with specificity, giving trial court an opportunity to cure any error, waives 
appellate review unless “fundamental error”). Simpson and the cases on which it relies 
fully set forth the origins and major concepts of plain error as a doctrine that is codified in 
early case law, statutes, and the Oklahoma Evidence Code that allows review of errors not 
preserved through objection “in the same manner” as preserved error, and that is subject to 
harmless-error analysis, in itself and in combination with other preserved and unpreserved 
errors. Id. at 692–702.  
 7. Simpson, 876 P.2d at 694 (citing Olano).
 8. Hogan v. State, 139 P.3d 907, 923 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006). 
 9. Simpson, 876 P.2d at 695 (prior cases refer to not only error, but error plus “injury” 
as necessary to reverse a conviction, defining “injury” as “an error which affected the 
result” (quoting Ryan v. State, 129 P. 685, 687 (Okla. Crim. App. 1913) (“By ‘injury’ is 
meant ‘effect upon the result’”)). The Court in Simpson concluded that “[w]hatever the 
label, an error which has no bearing on the outcome of the trial will not mandate a 
reversal,” id., and pointed out that “[o]bviously, the weaker the evidence . . . the less likely 
the error is to be harmless,” id. at 698 (comparing Foster v. State, 141 P. 449 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1914) (syllabus) (when evidence is strong, conviction will not be set aside, though 
error would require reversal in a doubtful case) with Mayberry v. State, 79 P.2d 1027, 1029 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1938) (holding that if evidence is weak and unsatisfactory, the record 
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substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right.”10 In 
plain-error doctrine, the Court has sought to avoid a “draconian” 
rule of total forfeiture of serious error, on the one hand, and the 
misguided approach of reversing “every time an error might 
prejudice a case,” on the other.11 The prejudice standard for 
plain error is therefore “prejudice/injury plus,”12 effectively 
meaning that a remedy for harmful plain error remains 
discretionary with the appellate court, not mandatory.13 Only 
“very” injurious plain errors that compromise important judicial 
values—errors that “‘seriously affect the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings”—warrant relief.14
 10. 20 O.S.2011, § 3001.1. “Structural” errors not subject to harmless-error review are 
an exception. Robinson v. State, 255 P.3d 425, 428 (Okla. Crim. App. 2011) (noting that 
structural-error doctrine, which applies where the violation is “of a right granted by the 
Constitution, rather than a violation of due process by failure to afford a right granted by 
state statute,” and which requires automatic reversal, applies to “a limited class” of 
constitutional errors). Appellants must generally demonstrate that state-law errors were 
harmful under the miscarriage-of-justice standard set forth in 20 O.S.2011, § 3001.1, while 
the State must establish that any federal constitutional errors found are harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Barnard v. State, 290 P.3d 759, 764–65 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013) 
(reviewing failure to instruct jury on element of offense for plain error due to lack of 
objection, but applying harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard due to constitutional 
violation) (citing Chapman v. Cal., 386 U.S. 18 (1967) and Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1 (1999)).  
 11. Simpson, 876 P.2d at 700.
 12. No less an authority that Dean Wigmore explained that 
[a]ppellate courts ordinarily are chary of claims of plain error because of their 
fear that they are being made unwitting accomplices to defense counsel who 
deliberately forgo the making of an objection in the hope that the trial court will 
unwittingly commit reversible plain error. To guard against such abuse of the 
adversary process, appellate courts insist that the error at trial to have been quite 
clear and obvious despite the absence of any objection. Furthermore, as a 
practical matter, the party claiming plain error will carry a far greater burden in 
convincing an appellate court that the error, even if “obvious,” was prejudicial. 
 . . . This principle of “prejudice plus” is sometimes enshrined in a formal rule. 
1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 18, 796 (4th ed. 
1983) (citations omitted). 
 13. Simpson, 876 P.2d at 702. The Simpson Court also noted that unless a more 
rigorous standard of prejudice was required for plain error, the “failure to object coupled 
with the allegation of plain error on appeal would give an Appellant more favorable review 
of this issue than in an instance where an objection was properly lodged.” Id. at 699.  
The only tactical reason to object in such a regime would be to avoid a reversible 
error in the trial court, a strategy that few, if any, defense lawyers would willingly employ 
in the long run. Every successful objection would reduce the trial court’s potential errors by 
one (objection to preserve error would be unnecessary), and thus compromise chances for 
reversal on appeal when conviction is likely (i.e., in most cases).  
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Effective defense lawyers strive to formulate timely 
motions and interpose contemporaneous objections seeking 
compliance with the rules of the game, resulting either in the 
desired relief or the preservation of trial-court error.15 The 
tactical penalty for failure to object is a finding of waiver, and in 
ethical as well as constitutional terms, it is possibly ineffective 
representation as well.16 So competent trial counsel raise formal 
challenges to the investigations, the charges, the procedures, the 
evidence, and the trial tactics of the opposition, theoretically 
offering a robust opportunity for the trial court’s discovery, and 
timely correction, of its (or the State’s) errors.17
Trial and appellate counsel these days are rarely one and 
the same; and the latter are rarely content to assert a handful of 
errors preserved by the former. Appellate lawyers typically raise 
the errors preserved below and their own allegations that 
someone violated the rules of the game, the latter both as 
freestanding assignments of plain error and as corresponding 
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.18 Indeed, 
appellate counsel sometimes assert plain error without raising 
15. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION 170–71 (3d ed. 1991) (setting out Defense Standard 4-3.6) [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS]. Recognizing that “[m]any important rights of the accused can be protected 
and preserved only by prompt legal action,” Defense Standard 4-3.6 directs counsel to 
“take all necessary action to vindicate such rights,” and also to 
consider all procedural steps which in good faith may be taken, including, for 
example, motions seeking pretrial release of the accused, obtaining psychiatric 
examination of the accused when a need appears, moving for change of venue or 
continuance, moving to suppress illegally obtained evidence, moving for 
severance from jointly charged defendants, and seeking dismissal of the charges. 
Id.
 16. See Okla. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1 (requiring “competent” representation); 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that a criminal defendant’s sixth 
amendment right to counsel is violated when a trial attorney’s performance is unreasonably 
deficient if there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance, the 
result would have been different). 
 17. Bias v. United States, 53 S.W. 471, 475 (Ind. Terr. 1899) (“One of the objects of 
making an exception specific and certain is that the judge of the trial court shall have it 
pointed to him, that he may correct it then and there, or at least have an opportunity to do 
so.”).  
 18. See Roy v. State, 152 P.3d 217, 227 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) (noting that appellate 
counsel “simply restates claims made elsewhere in his brief—casting the claims as 
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ineffectiveness at all,19 though the approach is at best 
contradictory, and perhaps its own kind of ineffective 
assistance.20 Coupled with their sixth amendment cousins or not, 
allegations of plain error today comprise perhaps the greatest 
number of claims presented for review.
Broadly speaking, on direct review of preserved claims, the 
Court applies the rules of the game and the deviation-injury 
archetype.21 Review of plain error, supposedly a distinct 
analytical exercise, is strikingly similar: judging the alleged 
error according to rules of the game (obvious deviation or 
not?);22 assessing its probable impact on the proceeding 
 19. See McIntosh v. State, 237 P.3d 800, 802–03 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010) (addressing 
unpreserved claim of error in trial court’s instruction on sentencing range, with no apparent 
corresponding claim of ineffective assistance). 
 20. See State v. Crislip, 785 P.2d 262, 269 (N.M. 1989) (Hartz, J., concurring) 
(“Perhaps as a practical matter every reversal predicated on plain error is a consequence of 
ineffective assistance of counsel”); Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1174 (10th Cir. 
2004) (“given appellate counsel’s willingness to raise so many (24) other alleged errors, we 
find it striking that appellate counsel never argued that trial counsel had been ineffective 
for not objecting . . . . Often, even ordinarily, one would expect a claim of ineffective 
assistance to accompany a claim of plain error”) (citations omitted); ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 15, at 246 (Standard 4-8.6(a): “If defense counsel, after investigation, is 
satisfied that another defense counsel who served in an earlier phase of the case did not 
provide effective assistance, he or she should not hesitate to seek relief for the defendant on 
that ground”).
 21. Neloms v. State, 274 P.3d 161, 164–66 (Okla. Crim. App. 2012) (finding  
admission of other-crimes evidence in violation of state statute to be harmless error); 
Webster v. State, 252 P.3d 259, 280–81 (Okla. Crim. App. 2011) (finding that admission of 
gruesome photographs was not unfairly prejudicial); Ball v. State, 173 P.3d 81, 91–92 
(Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (finding that error in the denial of defense instructions did not 
warrant reversal as it had not “probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice”). 
 22. See Faulkner v. State, 260 P.3d 430, 431–33 (Okla. Crim. App. 2011) (reviewing, 
as plain error, whether assistant district attorney’s participation in prosecution of former 
client violated due process, and finding that harmful error required reversal). The Court in 
Malone v. State, 293 P.3d 198 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013) explained the process: 
[T]he first step of plain error review of a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is to 
determine whether the prosecutor’s comments constitute an actual error. . . . The 
second step is to determine whether the error is plain on the record. . . . Only if 
the appellant has shown the existence of an actual error plain on the record do 
we turn to the third step of the analysis. . . . The third step is to determine 
whether the appellant has shown that the prosecutor’s misconduct affected his 
substantial rights . . . review[ing] the entire record to determine whether the 
cumulative effect of improper comments by the prosecutor . . . so infected the 
defendant’s trial that it was rendered fundamentally unfair. 
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(affected or not?);23 and when necessary, asking if the gravity of 
an error warrants an exception to forfeiture (“serious” effect on 
fairness, integrity, public reputation, or not?).24 Unless the 
claims are mooted by a dispositive remedy for one or more 
preserved or plain errors,25 the Court also addresses 
corresponding criticisms of trial representation in Strickland
parlance, asking whether trial counsel harmed the client’s 
position by forfeiting one or more serious violations of the rules 
of the game (committing errors “so serious” that the lawyer 
ceased to function as effective counsel, creating a reasonable 
probability that, but for the lawyer’s error, the outcome would 
have been different).26
 23. See Barnard, 290 P.3d at 764 (holding that the only way to determine whether the 
omission of the element from the jury instruction affected substantial rights “is to evaluate 
the error for its effect on the jury verdict”); Hanson v. State, 206 P.3d 1020, 1028 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 2009) (finding that appellant “must show that obvious error affected his 
substantial rights, that is the error affected the outcome of the proceeding”).
 24. As the Court articulated the plain-error prejudice analysis in Barnard:
[T]his Court does not automatically reverse, however, upon a finding of plain or 
obvious error. . . . [T]he error must have been one that affected the outcome of 
the proceeding. . . . Even then, we will only correct the error if the error 
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial 
proceedings or otherwise represents a miscarriage of justice.  
Barnard, 290 P.3d at 769 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, in 
McIntosh, where the Court found plain error in the instructions on the sentencing range for 
the crime, it concluded that the sentence must be modified because “we have no basis to 
conclude that this jury would have imposed the same thirty year sentence had it been 
properly instructed on the twelve year minimum,” which is to say because the error 
affected the outcome. 237 P.3d at 803. The Court made no separate mention of whether 
this plain error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the 
proceedings, though we may safely assume that it believed so.
 25. See Roy, 152 P.3d at 226–27 (finding that the failure to instruct the jury on the 85% 
Rule relating to the amount of time a life-sentenced defendant might spend in prison, and 
improper comments by the prosecutor, were plain errors requiring relief; that 
corresponding claims of ineffectiveness were moot; and consequently that court “need not 
decide whether counsel’s failure to seek an instruction regarding the 85% Rule constituted 
ineffective assistance”); Burton v. State, 204 P.3d 772, 777 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009) 
(related claim of ineffective assistance was mooted by court’s conclusion that search was 
illegal). 
 26. The discussion in Grissom v. State, 253 P.3d 969 (Okla. Crim. App. 2011) is fairly 
representative of the Strickland analysis of a host of forfeited claims already rejected in 
plain-error analysis:
In Propositions Ten and Eleven . . . Appellant argues that counsel was 
ineffective in failing to request proper instructions, failing to object to 
inadmissible evidence and improper arguments, and in failing to discover and 
utilize additional mitigating evidence of Appellant’s alleged dementia or brain 
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Despite these distinct analytical exercises, in the Court’s 
direct review of typical claims, functional equivalencies pervade 
both its rule-deviation assessments and its determinations of 
resulting harm. Respecting the standards of harm (our real focus 
here), the essential notion involved in the injury, substantial-
right, and miscarriage-of-justice standards of harm is that the 
error or errors affected the result. Preserved or not, errors that 
affected the result almost invariably appear serious to the Court 
in their adverse impact on the judicial values of fairness, 
integrity, and public reputation of proceedings, though it 
sometimes dispenses with saying so.27 And counsel’s failure to 
preserve any serious error would ordinarily warrant 
constitutional relief under Strickland, except that plain-error 
review usually beats Strickland analysis to the punch.28
.     .     . 
With regard to counsel’s failure to object to allegedly inadmissible evidence and 
improper jury instructions, and to request different instructions at trial, our 
conclusions that the evidence was properly admitted at trial, and that erroneous 
jury instructions did not result in prejudicial error, foreclose any claim of 
ineffectiveness based on these omissions.  
Id. at 994. 
 27. Thus, the Court has noted that unlawful double punishment for a single offense 
“would undoubtedly bring the fairness and integrity of the entire trial into serious 
question.” Barnard, 290 P.3d at 769. In both McIntosh, see note 24, supra, and Faulkner,
see note 22, supra, the Court found harmful plain error without expressly saying whether it 
“seriously” affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceedings, though it 
undoubtedly believed so, which suggests how readily the conclusion of harm follows upon 
a finding of a serious deviation from the rules of the game.  
 28. The relationship between plain-error review and Strickland analysis manifests in at 
least three ways. In a neutral sense, a conclusion that reversible plain error has occurred 
usually moots any related claim of ineffective assistance based on the failure to object. See,
e.g., Roy, 152 P.3d at 226–27. In a negative sense, a finding that no plain error occurred 
typically dooms a claim of ineffective counsel based on the same alleged act or omission. 
Coddington v. State, 142 P.3d 437, 461 (holding that failure to show plain error foreclosed 
any finding of Strickland prejudice in related challenge to counsel’s failure to object); 
Hancock v. State, 155 P.3d 796, 825 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (“There is no plain error. For 
the same reason, Appellant suffered no prejudice from counsel’s failure to object.”); Young 
v. State, 191 P.3d 601, 611 (Okla. Crim. App. 2008) (finding “that the prosecutor’s 
challenged remarks did not rise to the level of plain error,” and that “Appellant was 
therefore not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object”) (citing Hancock). In a positive 
sense, no case appears to suggest this equivalency quite so directly as the recent opinion in 
Levering v. State, 315 P.3d 392, 395 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013) (using plain-error analysis 
and also remanding in light of “strong possibility” that trial counsel was ineffective). 
Levering is atypical because either finding—harmful plain error or Strickland
prejudice—effectively dictated the same result and remedy. Similar cases include Hagos v. 
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The reasons for the conceptual overlap are humane and 
historic. Plain-error doctrine developed decades before the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland (or even Gideon29), and 
counterbalanced a harsh rule of waiver, protecting defendants 
from counsel’s failure to object to really harmful errors. Today’s
post-Gideon, post-Strickland sixth amendment compels 
appellate courts to discharge the same protective function 
through application of the Strickland framework to alleged 
errors in counsel’s representation. And regardless of the 
analytical jargon used, the judicial conscience recoils from the 
specter of a wrongful conviction or illegal punishment resulting 
from erroneous trial-court proceedings.30 That’s just bad, under 
any standard. 
The proposed new rule retains the sound policy of plenary 
direct review, while rationalizing its approach to preserved and 
unpreserved errors. It affords 
review of preserved non-constitutional errors 
according to the substantial-right/affected-the-
outcome standard drawn from the Oklahoma 
harmless-error statute,31 Simpson, and earlier cases;
review of sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
judgment or order appealed;
view, there is no appreciable difference between the two prejudice standards, the court of 
appeals was correct in its determination that defendant’s ineffective assistance claim fails 
for the same reason his plain error claim failed on direct review—that is, because he has 
failed to show that the error contributed to his conviction”); Crislip, 785 P.2d 262 
(reversing on an ineffective-assistance claim).
 29. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that indigent criminal 
defendant charged with felony has a constitutional right to appointed counsel). 
 30. As Justice Jackson famously said, “The mind of an appellate judge is habitually 
receptive to the suggestion that a lower court committed an error.” Robert H. Jackson, 
Advocacy before the Supreme Court, 25 TEMPLE L.Q. 115, 119 (1951). Having found an 
error, the humane judicial conscience is perhaps doubly inclined to perceive some form of 
prejudice. Only through careful and impartial examination of the facts are misguided 
technical reversals avoided, though some critics of the appellate courts despair of 
“harmless error” and seem to wish it otherwise. See generally, e.g., Charles S. Chapel, The 
Irony of Harmless Error, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 501 (1998) (offering deeply skeptical analysis 
of harmless-error doctrine by former Presiding Judge of Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals, and emphasizing author’s assessment that error analysis should focus on nature of 
alleged violation of defendant’s rights rather than possible effect of error on trial).
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review of legality of the sentence;32 and
review of preserved federal constitutional errors 
according to the “harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt” standard.33
The rule abolishes plain-error review of forfeited claims as a 
matter of course, leaving in its place a review of ineffective-
assistance claims according to clearly established federal law. 
As a final and appropriate failsafe, the rule provides the option 
for the Court to notice and remedy plain errors on its own 
motion.34
These changes eliminate the cumbersome process of 
categorizing and reviewing claims of preserved error, plain 
error, and ineffective counsel according to rhetorically distinct, 
but fundamentally equivalent, standards of harm. A unitary 
standard of harm—or prejudice, if you like—requiring a 
showing that any error “affected the result” ensures adequate 
relief for preserved, harmful errors. For serious errors forfeited 
 32. Sufficiency of the evidence, statutory and constitutional claims of multiple 
punishment, and other excessive- or illegal-sentencing claims, which arise more directly 
from the entry of judgment and sentence, are often reviewed without reference to 
preservation requirements. E.g., Davis v. State, 268 P.3d 86, 111 (Okla. Crim. App. 2011) 
(sufficiency of the evidence); Neloms, 274 P.3d at 169–71 (excessive sentence); but see
Barnard, 290 P.3d at 769 (addressing § 11 multiple-punishment and double-jeopardy 
claims and finding reversible plain error, as double punishment errors would “bring the 
fairness and integrity of the entire trial into serious question”). 
 33. Chapman v. Calif., 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). The automatic reversal accorded to 
structural errors is implied in the requirement of a harmless-error analysis compliant with 
clearly established federal law. Ariz. v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 294–95 (1991) (White, 
Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.) (defining structural errors that require automatic 
reversal).
 34. As Judge Lumpkin observed in Simpson, reversal in such instances should probably 
be “hen’s teeth rare.” Simpson, 876 P.2d at 700. Nevertheless, it happens. Appellant in a 
recent unpublished case was convicted of possession of a firearm after juvenile 
delinquency adjudication and given a consecutive six-year prison term. Counsel challenged 
the sufficiency of the evidence to show the adjudication was final, a claim with little or no 
merit under controlling law. Examination of the only exhibit supporting the adjudication 
showed no evidence of the nature of the delinquent act, though the statute required proof 
that it be for a crime that would be felony if committed by an adult. The prosecutor, 
defense counsel, the trial court, and appellate counsel did not notice this complete failure of 
the State’s only proof. The Court reversed the conviction with instructions to dismiss. Dan 
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by counsel’s failure to object, Strickland’s equivalent standard 
of prejudice ensures a proper remedy, drawing all harmful, 
forfeited errors within its protective sweep. The remaining errors 
are technical, harmless, and warrant no relief under either 
standard.
The Court’s historic and settled policy, to award relief 
where errors (preserved or plain, alone or in combination) affect 
the outcome, is a good one.35 Yet the Court needlessly sifts 
factually identical, forfeited claims through both plain-error 
review and the Strickland test, rarely, if ever, arriving at 
conflicting results.36 Plain-error review occasionally short-
circuits (which is to say moots) what would otherwise be a 
Strickland-based finding that counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object; but the Court’s continued plain-error review of 
forfeited claims probably detracts from a proper constitutional 
focus on trial counsel’s performance. Strickland and the Sixth 
Amendment should be the modern ramparts against counsel’s 
unreasonable forfeiture of harmful errors at trial.
However forcefully preserved, trial errors generally warrant 
no relief without a convincing showing of harm.37 And no truly 
 35. Jenkins v. State, 161 P.2d 90, 105–06 (Okla. Crim. App. 1945) (“Two things must 
concur before this court will set aside the judgment of a lower court: First, there must be 
error in the proceedings of the lower court; second, it must appear from the record that the 
defendant has suffered some injury from such error. This is our settled policy.”) (citing 
Byers v. Territory, 103 P. 532 (Okla. Crim. App. 1909)). 
 36. Whether the substantial-right/miscarriage-of-justice standard of harm for preserved 
error is identical in practice to the plain-error prejudice/injury-plus standard (as I maintain 
here), is academic. Direct review of preserved claims under that affected-the-result 
standard and Strickland review of forfeited claims will both continue as before. The 
important point is that plain error’s prejudice/injury-plus standard of harm and Strickland’s
standard of prejudice are effectively one and the same, meaning that we can do without 
resort to plain-error review in all but the rarest cases. See supra note 34 for that rarest of 
cases.
 37. The per curiam opinion on rehearing in Byers, written in the unmistakable voice of 
Chief Judge Henry Furman, who was before ascending to the bench a celebrated criminal-
defense lawyer, shows a court coming somewhat grudgingly to this recognition long ago:  
This brings us to consider the question as to whether the doctrine of harmless 
error is founded in justice, and supported by reason, and as to whether it should 
be enforced by the courts. All lawyers will agree that there is such a thing 
as error without injury. But few, if any, of them will admit that the doctrine of 
harmless error should be applied to any of their cases. It required the passage of 
over six years before a member of this court [i.e., Furman himself] could realize 
that this doctrine had been properly applied to one of his cases. The more we 
reflect upon the doctrine of harmless error the more clearly we will see that it is 
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harmful errors, preserved or forfeited, alone or in combination, 
can weather a conscientious application of the deviation-injury 
regime for preserved errors or Strickland’s two-pronged inquiry 
for forfeited ones. Strickland renders the plain-error doctrine a 
well-meaning, but archaic, distraction. The Court can ensure 
fairness without it by firmly enforcing the rules of the game and 
the right to competent counsel. 
enforcement by the appellate court is absolutely necessary for the administration 
of justice. 





      05/20/2015   10:47:31
36524-aap_15-2 Sheet No. 66 Side A      05/20/2015   10:47:31
DUPLERRESEND1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2015 1:37 PM 
PROPOSAL: A NEW RULE FOR ERROR REVIEW IN OKLAHOMA 271
APPENDIX
PROPOSED TEXT OF NEW R. CT. CRIM. APP. 3.12A
22 O.S. SUPP., CH. 18, APP.
1. In appeals filed pursuant to sections I(D)(5), II, VII, IX, 
and XI of these Rules, the Court shall review all 
propositions of error properly presented in the parties’ 
appellate briefs concerning:
a. any decision, ruling, instruction, finding of fact or 
law, or other allegedly erroneous act or omission, as 
to which the party or party’s counsel made a timely 
request for relief or a contemporaneous objection 
which was granted or denied by the trial court; 
b. sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment 
or order appealed; 
c. any claim that trial counsel’s representation was 
constitutionally ineffective under clearly established 
federal law; 
d. any claim that the punishment is illegal, excessive, 
cruel and/or unusual. 
No grounds for relief other than those enumerated in Parts 
1(a)–(d) of this Rule shall be reviewed in such appeals, 
except the Court shall conduct mandatory review of a 
capital sentence as required by law. Review of unpreserved 
claims or issues for plain error is abolished.  
If the Court finds that one or more errors have affected the 
outcome of the proceeding that is the subject of such an 
appeal, the Court shall reverse or modify the judgment or 
sentence, or order a new trial, re-sentencing, or other 
appropriate relief. If the Court finds that one or more errors 
affecting a party’s rights under the Constitution of the 
United States have occurred, it shall reverse or modify the 
judgment or sentence, unless it finds the error or errors 
harmless under clearly established federal law.  
2. In certiorari appeals filed pursuant to section IV of these 
Rules, the Court shall review all propositions of error 
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a. whether the plea was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary;  
b. whether the court had jurisdiction of the person and 
subject matter;38
c. any claim that trial counsel’s representation was 
constitutionally ineffective under clearly established 
federal law; and, 
d. any claim that the punishment is illegal, excessive, 
cruel and/or unusual. 
No grounds for relief other than those enumerated in Parts 
2(a)–(d) of this Rule shall be reviewed, except that the 
Court shall conduct mandatory review of a capital sentence 
as required by law. Any other review of unpreserved claims 
or issues for plain error is abolished.  
If the Court finds that one or more errors have affected the 
outcome of the proceeding, the Court shall reverse or 
modify the judgment or sentence, or order a new trial, re-
sentencing, or other appropriate relief. If the Court finds 
that one or more errors affecting a party’s rights under the 
Constitution of the United States have occurred, it shall 
reverse or modify the judgment or sentence, unless it finds 
the error or errors harmless under clearly established 
federal law. 
On its own motion, the Court may take notice of 
plain errors affecting substantial rights, and may grant any 
appropriate relief. 
 38.  Cox v. State, 152 P.3d 244, 247 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) (“On certiorari review of 
a guilty plea, our review is limited to two inquiries: (1) whether the guilty plea was made 
knowingly and voluntarily; and (2) whether the district court accepting the guilty plea had 
jurisdiction to accept the plea.”).  
